The Triumph of Irrational Schedule
Dr. Ghani (left) standing with Dr. Abdullah (right) in TV1 debate.
On 15th May 2014, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) confirmed that the Afghans will have to cast their votes for the second time in a run-off between the two leading candidates: Dr. Abdullah (45%) and Dr. Ghani (31%). In fact, IEC simply endorsed the widespread rumor of the run-off, which was leaked out right after the election by IEC insiders who always spoke to the media on the condition of anonymity.
Procedurally, IEC’s announcement conforms to the legally binding electoral schedule. Despite the candidates’ complaints during and after the Election Day, independent supervisory bodies have a general consensus on the presumption that IEC has not broken any legal procedures while taking this decision. But, putting aside the question of conformance to legal procedures, a macro analysis of the election process (i.e., the so-called bigger picture) exposes the latent irrationality within the confusing and somewhat random mechanics of IEC’s system.
Why should the final results’ announcement be delayed for six weeks? Again, it’s true that the electoral schedule requires so; but, why? The most plausible explanation points to the assumption of the long time it takes to address the complaints. Yet, the investigation of the complaints over the past six weeks have had little, if any, impact on the final results. If one compares the initial preliminary results (i.e., Dr. Abdullah 44% and Dr. Ghani 32%) with the final results (i.e., Dr. Abdullah 45% and Dr. Ghani 31%), one fact becomes discernible. Almost all complaints have been either baseless or ignored.
The probability of the former’s occurrence is minimal, given the high level of fraud documentation on various substantive inefficiencies from the lack of ballots to ballot-box stuffing. It becomes inevitable for the latter to have occurred. But, if the complaints did not have a material impact on the results (and are effectively ignored), what were the six weeks for?
Indeed, the six-week long theater of the public investigation of the complaints covered up the fraud engineering under the banner of adherence to the electoral schedule. This theater rationalizes in the votes’ mind the impossibility of committing frauds and robs the candidates of any legitimate claim to the contrary in the future. The leading candidates are positioned between a rock and a hard place. Although it seems rational to follow what the law requires; namely, the run-off round, it is irrational to consciously turn a blind eye to fraud engineering.
Unfortunately, the two runner-ups care more about political power (rather than political reform) and have opted for the run-off, thereby refraining to first shed lights on the committed frauds – and will perhaps keep refraining until the ultimate result is out. From this part onward, the process will resemble the game-theoretic case of an uncooperative bargaining for distribution of power at the expense of a genuine political commitment to the voters.
The design of Afghanistan’s election process and its electoral law stands upon an irrational premise (i.e., complaints’ investigation) that allows the fraud engineering to take place. The leading candidates – as rational self-interested actors - have made their choice to be part of this irrational order.