President-CEO Divide: Bringing Charm Offensive to Afghan Politics

“Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomes Afghanistan’s President and CEO at NATO Headquarter.”

More than a month has passed since the NATO allies urged the presidential candidates, Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, to take the road of political reconciliation. The immediate consequence looked promising as President Ghani and CEO Abdullah were sworn into the office. Will the national unity government (hereafter NUG) pass the first and the most challenging test of strength; namely, forming the cabinet within the two-month legal timeline?

The NUG was born amidst despair, reluctance, and foreign intervention. In July 2014, Afghanistan was on the edge of a political collapse. While Matthew Rosenberg of New York Times, on 18th August, talked about the possibilities for a coup as a result of the election impasse, the streets of Kabul began to be packed by angry youngsters who set up tents for long term, more organized protests.

However, on 21st September, the power-sharing deal, which formed the basis of the NUG, silenced the inflammatory tones of activists in both candidates’ camps. Indeed, the look of the deal did give comfort to the ordinary Afghans. The reconciliation of Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah was quickly met with public approval. The very act of agreement between rivals upheld an incredible amount of hope within Afghans’ war-stricken political psyche.

From that point onward, President Ghani unleashed a subtle charm offensive campaign to consolidate his social base within Afghans’ minds and hearts. In the shortest timespan, he turned out to be the pop culture star as he’s given impromptu visits to high schools, detention centers, hospitals, police stations, and the like. It’s now a common knowledge on the streets of Kabul that the president is blessed with a series of hands-on leadership characteristics such as making quick, smart, and well-thought-out decisions.

On 2nd November, the Tolonews’ poll confirmed President Ghani’s surge in popularity, finding that 84 percent of Afghans are either very or moderately satisfied with the president’s actions and decisions.

On the other hand, CEO Abdullah’s popularity remained confined to his acceptance of the political reconciliation. President Ghani’s charm offensive campaign gives the appearance of his tenacious fight to reform the affairs of the Afghan state while copping with political formalities and bottlenecks that make themselves known in the persona of CEO Abdullah.

In response, CEO Abdullah has launched his own account of charm offensive, accusing President Ghani’s close advisor Omar Zakhilwal of corruption and involvement in the Kabul Bank scandal. Further, he’s taken long walks in the streets of Kabul to chalk out an opener picture of himself in people’s mind, catching up with the president’s popular appeal.

Insofar as CEO Abdullah fails to establish and communicate a strong link between his performance as the chief executive and popularity, the balance of social power leans in favor of the president rather than the CEO, in particular, on an occasion of a dispute over the cabinet between the two. Whatever the solution to the dispute might be, when eight out of ten Afghans approve the president’s performance, his decisions to confront the CEO will be met with more public approval.